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THE CHAOS OF THE CFAA: FACEBOOK’S 
SUCCESSFUL CFAA CLAIM AFFECTS WEBSITE 
OWNERS, COMPETITORS, AND YOU 
Breana Love* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.,1the Ninth Circuit 
created precedent that built upon previous decisions regarding the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).2 The court interpreted the 
statute to solidify who can grant and revoke authorization to access a 
website and how they can do it. 
A start-up company, Power Ventures, Inc. (“Power”), accessed 
Facebook’s website to peddle its service to Facebook users.3 By 
clicking a consent button, Facebook users authorized Power to enter 
into their Facebook accounts and send messages through Facebook’s 
servers.4 This activity elicited immediate action by Facebook in the 
form of a cease and desist letter to Power.5 Facebook then sued Power 
under the theory that Power violated the CFAA when it continued to 
access Facebook without authorization after receiving, and failing to 
abide by, the cease and desist letter.6 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held 
that although Facebook users could grant third parties, like Power, 
authorization to enter Facebook through their personal accounts, 
Facebook could nonetheless revoke such authorization by serving an 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Music Business, The 
University of Texas at Austin, 2015. Thanks to Professor Aaron Ghirardelli for sharing his 
invaluable expertise and feedback throughout the writing process, to the members of the Loyola of 
Los Angles Law Review for their attention and hard work, and to my family and friends for their 
unwavering support. 
 1. (Power Ventures II), 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 2. See generally LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (Brekka); 
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nosal I); United States v. Nosal, 828 F.3d 
865 (9th Cir. 2016) (Nosal II), vacated in part, 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 3. Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d at 1062. 
 4. Id. at 1063. 
 5. Id. at 1062. 
 6. Id. 
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affirmative notice to the third party.7 Facebook’s cease and desist 
letter to Power fulfilled this requirement, and Power’s continuance 
thereafter sealed its fate.8 
The Ninth Circuit reached an appropriate decision based on the 
facts present in this particular case. However, the court’s muddled 
reasoning conflicts with earlier Ninth Circuit cases and fails to 
adequately define the scope of the CFAA, especially in regards to 
everyday Internet users (“everyday users”).9 Therefore, the need for 
clarification on the CFAA and its reach continues. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual and procedural 
record of Power Ventures II. Part III explores the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the CFAA against the backdrop of the general rules 
derived from previous Ninth Circuit cases. Part IV explains how this 
case differs from the reasoning in similar, prior cases, and how the 
continued discrepancy will affect website owners, third party 
businesses, and everyday users. Part V concludes that the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately succeeded in reaching an adequate judgment, but it 
failed to fully illuminate the CFAA and whether its scope 
encompasses everyday users as well as businesses. The continued 
uncertainty regarding the CFAA creates a plethora of possibilities that 
concern third parties competing with powerful website owners and 
everyday users who worry about the potential loss of autonomy over 
their information and even criminal liability. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves two online social networking platforms: 
Facebook and Power Ventures. Facebook is a popular website that had 
hosted over 130 million registered users as of 2008 and allowed them 
to store personal data and connect with one another.10 By contrast, 
 
 7. Id. at 1067. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendants-Appellants at 9, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 13-17154), https://www.eff.org/files/2016/08/29/089_amicus_curiae_brief_of_eff_aclu_and 
_aclu_nc_8.19.16.pdf (“The panel’s reasoning is also in tension with Nosal II . . . .”); see also Orin 
Kerr, 9th Circuit: It’s a Federal Crime to Visit a Website After Being Told Not to Visit It, WASH. 
POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/07/12/ 
9th-circuit-its-a-federal-crime-to-visit-a-website-after-being-told-not-to-visit-it/?utm_term=.bfd7a 
149de09 (disagreeing with distinguishing this case from Nosal I because this case does not involve 
non-compliance with terms of services). 
 10. Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d at 1062. 
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Power is a forgotten start-up that had accumulated 20 million 
registered users at its peak in 2008.11 Power’s platform allowed 
registered users to aggregate their data from other social networking 
sites, like Facebook, onto Power’s site.12 Essentially, this service 
allowed users to view all their information scattered on various 
networks on one integrated website.13 To attract more users, Power 
initiated a promotional campaign where the first one hundred people 
who brought one hundred new friends to Power.com received $100.14 
By selecting the “Yes, I do!” button, users could share this campaign 
invitation to their current Facebook friends.15 This allowed Power to 
access Facebook.com and caused either a form message or a form e-
mail to be sent.16 The amount of sent messages is unknown; however, 
there were over sixty-thousand e-mails sent.17 
Facebook took issue with how Power accessed its website 
because it had taken deliberate steps to limit and control access by 
non-registered third parties.18 For instance, Facebook created a 
program called Facebook Connect that allows third party businesses 
access to Facebook only if the third parties register with Facebook and 
agree to abide by the Terms of Use (“TOU”) and an additional 
Developer TOU (collectively, “TOU Agreements”).19 Power had not 
agreed to these TOU Agreements at the time of soliciting the 
messages.20 
When Facebook learned of Power’s campaign, it sent a cease and 
desist letter that same day, instructing Power to terminate its current 
activities.21 Facebook then tried to convince Power to agree to its TOU 
 
 11. Aarti Shahani, The Man Who Stood Up to Facebook, NPR (Oct. 13, 2016, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/10/13/497820170/the-man-who-stood-up-to-
facebook. 
 12. Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d at 1062. 
 13. Id.; see also Matt Mansfield, Social Media Statistics 2016, SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Nov. 
22, 2016), https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2m_7r3UMMrgJ:https:// 
smallbiztrends.com/2016/11/social-media-statistics-2016.html+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us 
(As of 2016, “[i]nternet users have [an] average [of] 7 social accounts” and “[m]ore than half of 
online adults . . . use more than one of . . . five social media platforms.”). 
 14. Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d at 1063. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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Agreements for future involvement.22 After receiving the letter, 
Power’s owner assured Facebook that they would comply with 
Facebook’s demands.23 However, a following e-mail retracted that 
promise of compliance, and Power refused Facebook’s olive branch.24 
It continued the campaign and relied on its system to defend against 
Facebook’s Internet Protocol (“IP”) blocks that inevitably followed.25 
These actions pushed Facebook to file a lawsuit against Power, and 
the time and money that the litigation demanded eventually forced 
Power to shut down permanently.26 
Facebook’s complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California, alleged that Power violated: (1) the 
CFAA, (2) the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography 
and Marketing Act (“CAN-SPAM Act”), and (3) section 502 of the 
California Penal Code.27 The district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Facebook for each claim,28 but the Ninth Circuit’s 
judgment on appeal differed in some respects. The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the CAN-SPAM judgment in favor of Power, and although it 
affirmed the CFAA and California Penal Code judgments, it did so 
upon different reasoning.29 
Power petitioned for a full rehearing of the case due to the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding on the CFAA issue,30 which allegedly contradicted 
the court’s prior decision in United States v. Nosal.31 The Ninth Circuit 
denied the rehearing petition, but it amended Power Ventures II by 
deleting specific references to Nosal II and replacing them with a 
declaration that the analysis was “consistent with Nosal II.”32 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc. (Power Ventures I), 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031 
(N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d at 1063. 
 26. Episode 741: Amy and Steve vs. Facebook, NPR (Dec. 9, 2016, 8:23 PM), http:// 
www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=504999255. 
 27. Power Ventures I, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1027. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d at 1062. 
 30. Steven Trader, 9th Circ. Denies Full Rehearing in Facebook CFAA Suit, LAW 360 (Dec. 
9, 2016, 5:57 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/871093/9th-circ-denies-full-rehearing-in-
facebook-cfaa-suit?article_related_content=1. 
 31. 828 F.3d 865 (9th Cir.), vacated in part, 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 32. Trader, supra note 30. 
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Currently, Power is seeking the ear of the United States Supreme 
Court.33 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
By interpreting the CFAA, assessing precedent, and rationalizing 
through an analogy, the Ninth Circuit arrived at a different decision 
from that of the District Court. Although Power Ventures involved 
other legal doctrines like the CAN-SPAM Act and the California Penal 
Code, this Comment will focus on the “most noteworthy” issue: the 
court’s analysis of the CFAA.34 
A.  The CFAA 
The CFAA is a federal law that creates criminal and civil liability 
for whomever “intentionally accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access and thereby obtains . . . 
information from any protected computer.”35 In 1984, before the 
Internet existed, Congress enacted the CFAA to secure government 
computers from hackers “to keep ‘bad’ information and ‘bad’ people 
out of computer systems.”36 However, over the next few years, the 
Internet emerged and furthered the computer’s reach through an 
elaborate system of networks.37 To accommodate this quick and 
constant evolution, Congress expanded the CFAA through multiple 
amendments.38 Despite these efforts, the CFAA’s scope as to Internet 
users, such as business competitors and everyday users, remained 
ambiguous. This failure to clarify the statute is mainly due to the fact 
that the CFAA was enacted to “regulate an architecture that has since 
been demolished and rebuilt . . . .”39 
 
 33. Episode 741, supra note 26. 
 34. James D. McNairy, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.: Shotgun-Toting Borrowers of 
Jewelry From Bank Safe Deposit Boxes and the CFAA. Wait. What?, TRADING SECRETS (July 19, 
2016), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2016/07/articles/computer-fraud/facebook-inc-v-power-
ventures-inc-shotgun-toting-borrowers-of-jewelry-from-bank-safe-deposit-boxes-and-the-cfaa-
wait-what/. 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2008). 
 36. Michael J. Madison, Authority and Authors and Codes, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1616, 
1621 (2016). 
 37. Id. at 1622. 
 38. PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 737 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that the CFAA was amended in 1986, 1994, 
and 1996). 
 39. Madison, supra note 36. 
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The statute’s main issue is its combination of overly broad 
explanations for some terms and the complete omission of 
explanations for other terms. For instance, the definition of a 
“protected computer” is broad enough to “capture any Internet-
connected computer.”40 Thus, an everyday user that accesses any 
computer, whether it is a friend’s, a spouse’s, or a family member’s 
computer, could potentially be held criminally liable if he or she 
accessed it without proper authorization.41 Additionally, the CFAA 
fails to define what does and what does not constitute 
“authorization,”42 nor does it indicate who can provide such 
authorization when accessing a website.43 In attempting to answer the 
questions caused by the statute’s ambiguity, the court in Power 
Ventures turned to prior cases. 
B.  Prior Ninth Circuit Cases 
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka44 was the first case of this kind 
before the Ninth Circuit. It involved an employee who logged into his 
employer’s computer and sent himself confidential information in 
order to form a competing business.45 The employer sued the 
employee for violating the CFAA by accessing the employer’s files 
without authorization.46 The court held that a person acts “without 
authorization” when the person has not received permission to use the 
computer for any purpose or when such permission has been explicitly 
revoked.47 The court held that because the employee was employed at 
the time he logged into the computer, his authorization was never 
revoked; thus, he did not violate the CFAA.48 Had he accessed the 
information after he quit, then he would have been acting without 
authorization.49 
 
 40. BELLIA, supra note 38, at 737. 
 41. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
 42. Some courts have recently expressed that the term “authorization” in the CFAA is so 
indeterminate that the act is void for vagueness. See Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass 
Framework for the Crime of Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1479 (2016). 
 43. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 9, at 4. 
 44. (Brekka), 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 45. Id. at 1134. 
 46. Id. at 1128–29. 
 47. Id. at 1135. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1136. 
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United States v. Nosal50 was another case that allowed the Ninth 
Circuit to examine the CFAA. There, Nosal convinced two current 
employees at his old job to access the company’s computer and send 
him confidential information so that he could start a competing 
business.51 Because the wrongful access “exceeded authorized access” 
by violating the TOU, the employer claimed that the employees 
violated the CFAA.52 Cautious of creating a sweeping policy decision 
that could impose criminal liability on all users that violate a website’s 
TOU, the court did not hold the defendants liable.53 Thereafter, 
violations of the TOU alone do not amount to violating the CFAA.54 
The Ninth Circuit then assessed a separate issue within the Nosal 
case. In Nosal II,55 the employer claimed that Nosal violated the 
CFAA not by being an accomplice to exceeding authorization, but by 
accessing information without authorization.56 At this point, the two 
current employees involved in Nosal I had quit and joined forces with 
Nosal.57 In order to continue obtaining information, Nosal had the two 
former employees convince a different current employee to share her 
password information.58 By using the current employee’s login 
credentials, the two former employees sent Nosal the employer’s 
files.59 The court decided that Nosal’s authorization was revoked the 
day he quit, and that he could not “sidestep the statute by going 
through the back door and accessing the computer through a third 
party.”60 Thus, the court held that the current employee’s authorization 
did not suffice.61 It interpreted “authorization” to mean that an entity 
can grant permission, but that the current employee had “no mantle or 
authority to override [the employer’s] authority to control access to 
its . . . information.”62 
 
 50. (Nosal I), 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 51. Id. at 856. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 862–63. 
 54. Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 55. United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 844 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 56. Id. at 1029. 
 57. See id. at 1031. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1028. 
 61. Id. at 1035. 
 62. Id. 
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From these cases, the court carved out some general rules that 
assisted their analysis in Power Ventures II.63 Specifically, it 
referenced the rules in Brekka and Nosal I.64 Although the court 
initially referenced the rules in Nosal II, it deleted these insertions and 
stated that Power Ventures II remained consistent with Nosal II.65 This 
alteration is mainly due to Power’s contest that the court’s current 
holding contradicts the holding in Nosal II.66 Despite this hiccup, the 
court solidified these general rules and applied them to the facts in 
Power Ventures II.67 
C.  The Court’s CFAA Conclusion 
First, the court assessed whether Power accessed Facebook’s 
computers “without authorization.”68 The court found that because 
Facebook authorizes its users to access its services, then Facebook 
users are able to transfer this authorization to a third party.69 Thus, it 
held that Power initially had authorization to access Facebook’s 
services on the Facebook users’ behalf when the users voluntarily and 
affirmatively clicked the “Yes, I do!” button.70 This is “akin to 
allowing a friend to use a computer or to log onto an e-mail account.”71 
However, the court held that Power began to act “without 
authorization” once Facebook expressly rescinded that permission by 
way of a written cease and desist letter.72 Even after knowing that it 
lacked authorization, Power continued its campaign and dodged 
Facebook’s IP blocks along the way.73  
Inevitably, the court held that this persistent action constituted a 
CFAA violation because “consent that Power had received from 
Facebook users was not sufficient to grant continuing 
authorization . . . after Facebook’s express revocation of 
permission.”74 Therefore, the court’s holding was consistent with 
 
 63. 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Trader, supra note 30; see Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d at 1067. 
 66. Trader, supra note 30. 
 67. Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d at 1067. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1067. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1068. 
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Nosal I because the initial violation of Facebook’s TOU did not 
condemn Power, but Power’s continued violations after the execution 
of a cease and desist letter did.75 Additionally, consistent with Brekka, 
the letter served as affirmative notice that Power’s authorization was 
revoked, and its relationship with Facebook users could not serve as a 
loophole.76 
The court also initiated a new general rule that built upon this 
foundation, and it did so through an analogy. It compared the situation 
to a person borrowing jewelry from a friend.77 The friend granted the 
borrower permission and a key to access the jewelry that was kept in 
a safe deposit box in the bank.78 However, the bank kicked the 
borrower out when he entered the bank carrying a shotgun.79 Thus, 
“the person need[ed] permission both from his friend (who controls 
access to the safe) and from the bank (which controls access to its 
premises).”80 Here, Power initially had authorization from Facebook 
users who controlled their personal pages, but it also needed 
Facebook’s authorization because Facebook controls the overall 
physical servers.81 
Based on this analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that the initial 
authorization bestowed upon Power from Facebook users terminated 
once Facebook explicitly rescinded its authorization via a cease and 
desist letter.82 Therefore, Power’s continued actions subsequent to the 
letter constituted access “without authorization” and rendered Power 
liabile under the CFAA.83 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Decision’s Faults 
The Power Ventures II court claimed to base its ruling on general 
rules it gleaned from prior cases; however, the result actually 
contradicted some of these rules. For instance, Power Ventures II’s 
 
 75. See id. at 1068–69. 
 76. Id. at 1068. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
50.4_LOVE_V.9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/22/19  8:46 PM 
840 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:831 
decision is “irreconcilable with the Ninth Circuit’s”84 decision in 
Nosal II. As explained above, the court in Nosal II concluded that an 
employee with legitimate login credentials did not have the authority 
to grant access to an employer’s computer; only the company could 
grant such access.85 In contrast, here, the court held that—at least 
initially—Facebook users with legitimate login credentials did have 
authority to grant access to Power.86 This discrepancy could be solved 
by an explanation of how the court viewed the rule from Nosal II, but 
the court abstained from such an explanation and instead brushed it 
under the rug by conclusively stating that the rulings were consistent.87 
Further, the decision also ignores a pressing issue that arose in 
Nosal I. Nosal I declared that TOU violations alone would not qualify 
for CFAA liability.88 Here, the court held that this case did not involve 
such an issue since “Facebook and Power had no direct relationship, 
and it does not appear that Power was subject to any contractual terms 
that it could have breached.”89 However, this conclusion is incorrect 
because when a third party uses a service through the account of 
someone who has assented to the TOU, that third party is bound by 
the TOU as if they had assented.90 Power was bound by Facebook’s 
TOU because it entered the site via Facebook users who had assented 
to the TOU.91 Therefore, the court erred by dismissing this issue. 
Additionally, the court failed to adequately explain how Nosal I’s 
general rule and this new rule fit together. After incorrectly dismissing 
the issue, the court then distinguished Nosal I from this case by stating 
that Nosal I was concerned with the threat of penalizing unaware users 
that inadvertently violated frequently changing TOU.92 Conversely, in 
Power Ventures II, that same threat was not at issue since Power 
received a cease and desist letter notifying them of such violations.93 
It is true that the concern expressed in Nosal I is eradicated when the 
defendant is put on notice of the TOU. However, there is still some 
 
 84. Trader, supra note 30; see Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 9, at 2. 
 85. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 9, at 9. 
 86. See id. at 10. 
 87. Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1069. 
 90. Amyt Eckstein, Enforceability of Website Terms of Use, 18 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N, no. 2, Fall 
2009, at 4. 
 91. See Power Ventures II, 844 F.3d at 1062–63. 
 92. Id. at 1069. 
 93. Id. 
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discomfort in this distinction because some view this holding as a 
roundabout way to effectively hold defendants liable for mere 
violations of the TOU.94 It is confusing that a website owner can have 
express language in their TOU denying access to a certain party, but 
the party’s access is “not deemed ‘unauthorized’ unless that very same 
language is sent in the form of a cease and desist letter.”95 It seems to 
be a “distinction without a difference.”96 
Although the court clarified in a footnote that the mention of a 
TOU violation in the cease and desist letter was not dispositive, it then 
highlighted how the letter also warned Power that it may have violated 
federal and state law.97 Therefore, if the court follows Nosal I and only 
attaches CFAA liability when there is something additional to a TOU 
violation, then what is that additional thing? Is it only a notice, or is it 
a notice that also warns of violations other than those of the TOU? If 
it is only a notice, then what level of notice is required?98 Is a formal 
cease and desist letter by itself sufficient?99 These questions currently 
remain unanswered. 
Finally, the court’s “shotgun-toting-borrower-of-jewelry” 
analogy100 has also been criticized as “simplistic, even clumsy.”101 
Although the analogy might have helped this court better understand 
the technology at issue, it “lacks the nuance that can swirl around 
alleged ‘scraping’ scenarios” that differ from this case.102 Like the 
other questionable stances taken, this analogy seems tailored to the 
 
 94. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 9, at 2–8 (stating that the “basis 
for the cease and desist letter . . . was Facebook’s perception that Power was violating its terms of 
service . . . .”). 
 95. Kyri Tsircou, Facebook v. Power Ventures When Accessing a Website is a Federal Crime, 
TSIRCOU: INTELL. PROP. L. (July 25, 2016), http://tsircoulaw.com/uncategorized/facebook-v-
power-ventures-when-accessing-a-website-is-a-federal-crime; Alison Frankel, Facebook to 
‘Millions of Internet Users’: Relax, You’re Not Engaged in Computer Fraud, REUTERS (Sept. 20, 
2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/09/20/facebook-to-millions-of-internet-users-
relax-youre-not-engaged-in-computer-fraud. 
 96. Frankel, supra note 95. 
 97. Jeffrey Neuburger, CFAA Double Feature: Ninth Circuit Issues Two Important Decisions 
on the Scope of Liability Related to Data Scraping and Unauthorized Access to Employer 
Databases, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA AND TECH. L. BLOG (July 14, 2016), http://newmedia 
law.proskauer.com/2016/07/14/cfaa-double-feature-ninth-circuit-issues-two-important-decisions-
on-the-scope-of-liability-related-to-data-scraping-and-unauthorized-access-to-employer-
databases. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
    100.   See McNairy, supra note 34. 
 101. Madison, supra note 36, at 1631. 
 102. McNairy, supra note 34. 
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specific facts of Power Ventures II. This helped the court decide the 
case at issue, but it will not be of much help to future litigants who try 
to apply this precedent to their similar, yet different situations. 
B.  The Decision’s Effects 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision “set a huge legal precedent that 
could affect every person online.”103 While the concerns listed above 
“muddied the waters” regarding what constitutes unauthorized access 
for everyday users, it somewhat clarifies how website owners and 
third-party companies conduct business.104 
1.  Effects on Businesses 
This new precedent guides two different types of businesses: the 
website owner, like Facebook, and third party businesses, like Power. 
Power Ventures II introduced a formula that benefits owners. 
Hereafter, it is likely that owners, if they have not already, will 
carefully draft their TOU to explicitly state the forms of access that 
the owner prohibits.105 Owners will then meticulously monitor their 
website for any unwanted access by unauthorized users.106 Finally, 
once such access is detected, owners will promptly send a cease and 
desist letter to notify the perpetrators of the violation and demand that 
they terminate the activities.107 Website owners, like Facebook, could 
argue that such heightened security measures are needed to “regulate 
access for security reasons.”108 This argument may be true for many 
website owners, but it is suspect for those larger owners that occupy a 
substantial amount of the current marketplace—monopoly-like 
companies like Facebook. Some find that website owners like 
Facebook are really resorting to these measures, not to protect their 
platforms, but to eradicate competing third party businesses.109 
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As for third-party businesses, the future looks bleak. It is true that 
authorized users can grant such entities lawful access to a website, 
making websites “presumptively open to all comers.”110 However, this 
warm welcome can come to a swift end if the website owner expressly 
revokes permission through a notice.111 Therefore, the third party can 
“intentionally violate the [TOU] but [it] cannot intentionally ignore a 
cease and desist letter.”112 
This could likely lead to the situation that the court referred to in 
a footnote but chose not to address:113 a situation where a website 
owner, because of the formula portrayed in Power Ventures II, 
initiates an “automatic boilerplate revocation” that follows any and 
every violation of the website’s TOU.114 Such action could create 
long-term effects, initiating issues regarding Internet monopolies and 
whether social media platforms like Facebook amount to “public 
forum[s].”115 However, the court abstained from addressing this issue, 
so this Comment can only speculate as to this possibility. 
2.  Effects on Everyday Users 
The effects of Power Ventures II on everyday users is less clear 
than the effects on the businesses discussed above. This decision has 
the potential to stretch the CFAA beyond its original scope by 
criminalizing everyday users for everyday uses. For instance, suppose 
that a family member uses your Amazon account with your 
permission, but then a pop-up notice warns that only registered users 
are allowed to stream videos.116 Power Ventures I implies that the 
family member is a third party accessing the website legally by way 
of you, a registered user, but that permission is expressly revoked by 
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receiving the notice.117 Thus, use of an account in this way is not just 
a “bad thing,” it is a crime.118 
Although a reasoned reading of this case allows for such 
possibilities,119 it is unlikely that criminal liability under the CFAA 
would be imposed on the average Joe logging onto a family member 
or friend’s account. As demonstrated above, the court in Power 
Ventures II based its reasoning on the case’s specific facts, which 
involved two businesses rather than an everyday user. Thus, the ruling 
is likely limited to the “narrow and stark facts of this case,” so 
“[o]rdinary folk have nothing to worry about.”120 However, even if the 
CFAA never imposes criminal liability on an everyday user, the court 
must still deal with the fact that this decision “opened up [] Pandora’s 
box.”121 The Ninth Circuit allowed such a possibility to become 
reality, and only clarification can calm these concerns. 
Moreover, even if everyday users are not held criminally liable, 
this decision still affects them. Power Ventures I concluded that a third 
party must retain authority from both the website owner and the 
authorized user.122 This essentially is a message to users that “they 
don’t control their data.”123 “Our Facebook account may feel like 
private property, but we’re not allowed to give away the keys. It is 
Facebook’s house.”124 Facebook users opted to allow Power into their 
accounts so that they could view their personal data on one site, 
Power’s site. However, Facebook slammed the door on this option by 
sending the cease and desist letter. Aside from the fact that Facebook’s 
TOU requires third party businesses to enter a separate agreement, 
Facebook opposed this access because it makes money off the ads it 
places next to your personal data.125 Thus, if you are not visiting and 
viewing your data on Facebook, then Power is essentially stealing 
business from Facebook. 
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Additionally, this holding could reach even further than limiting 
access to competitors. It could also limit users’ ability to utilize 
companies that offer a service that Facebook does not.126 For instance, 
if Facebook did not provide a way for users to delete their data, then 
users could be precluded from resorting to third parties that offer this 
service if Facebook does not approve.127 Therefore, this ruling gives 
Facebook greater power to reduce its users’ ability to control their 
personal data, leading to further potential issues in the realm of 
Internet monopolies. 
C.  The Correct Decision for This Case 
Despite the mistakes and concerns listed above, the court reached 
the correct ruling in this particular case. In the real world, a person 
commits trespass when he or she ignores a property owner’s command 
to keep out and continues to sneak in.128 Here, Power, a sophisticated 
business, defied a “targeted instruction to stay away,” and relied on its 
system to thwart Facebook’s technological defenses thereafter.129 
Power’s relentless actions labeled it an “egregious computer 
trespasser,” and warranted liability under the CFAA.130 Thus, Power 
acted synonymously to a “hacker,” which concerns the CFAA. 
Although this decision remains narrowly applicable to the facts of this 
specific case, there remains an impending need for the court to clarify 
on the questionable grounds discussed above.131 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The court reached the correct result, but its reasoning will lead to 
future litigation because the CFAA “continues to be beset with 
problems.”132 Clarity on this law is essential, as cyberspace and 
e-commerce law continues to evolve, and businesses are ready to duke 
it out to set the groundwork.133 Power Ventures II might not be the 
right vehicle to clarify the CFAA, but sooner or later a court must take 
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on the job.134 Currently, Power is seeking the former with its appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court.135 If the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari, the end result should remain the same, but all would benefit 
from a clarification of the parameters of the CFAA, its intended scope, 
and whom it affects. 
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